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1. Introduction
The theory of optimal screening contracts applies to a large variety of
relevant topics such as nonlinear pricing, monopoly regulation, procurement,
optimal taxation and auctions. Most of these applications are based on
the simplifying assumption that agent’s types can be ‘ordered’ by a single
dimension of private information. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the
analysis and leads to well deﬁned results; for instance, the optimal contract
prescribes that ‘lower’ types be distorted in order to extract the informational
rent from the ‘higher’ types.
There are, however, many economic contexts where a single parameter of
private information is not suﬃcient to model economic problems accurately.
For example, a multiproduct monopolist may face consumers whose prefer-
ences are best described by a diﬀerent taste parameter for each good. Clearly,
when consumerspreferences are not publicly observable, the nonlinearpricing
problem of the monopolist can only be analysed by means of a multidimen-
sional screening model. Another weakness of one-dimensional models is that
the results they provide are not very robust. In fact, as shown in the recent
theoretical literature,1 many of the properties of optimal contracts can be
lost when further dimensions of private information are introduced into the
model. All this calls for the introduction of multidimensional models.
Unfortunately, the analysis of general multidimensional screening prob-
lems is far more complex as compared to the single dimensional case. There
are certainly a few interesting results on the qualitative properties of the
1 See Armstrong (1996), Rochet and Chon´ e (1998), Armstrong and Rochet (1999)
among others.
1optimal contracts, but multidimensional analysis has not yet succeded in
providing closed-form solutions to the general model. Research in this area
proceeds then by the identiﬁcation and the study of tractable special cases.2
In this paper we show the variety of optimal screening contracts that
might arise in a simple multidimensional framework `a l a Armstrong and
Rochet (1999), where only three types of agents are present. Even such
a relatively simple context exhibits the typical diﬃculty characterizing all
the multidimensional models, which is the absence of an exogenous pattern
of binding incentive compatibility constraints. We will show that several
patterns of binding constraints are possible and that they determine optimal
contracts with quite unusual and counter-intuitive features.
Section 2 introduces the basic assumptions of a principal-agent model
where the agent is engaged in two activities and has private information on
two discrete technological parameters. Section 3 derives the optimal contract
when the agent’s type with ‘high’ technological eﬃciency in both activities
is not present. In Section 4 the missing type is the one with ‘low’ eﬃciency
in both activities, while Section 5 deals with the more standard case where
one of the ‘mixed’ types is absent.
2. Basic assumptions
In a principal-agent framework the agent can undertake two kinds of
activities denoted by A and B.3 The levels of the two activities are given,
2 For an excellent survey of the literature on multidimensional screening see Rochet
and Stole (2003).
3 The model presented below has been analysed by Spence (1980), Dana (1993) and
Armstrong and Rochet (1999) among others.
2respectively, by the positive real variables xA and xB. The agent has private
information on technology in both activities. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
technology may exhibit either High or Low eﬃciency, so that there can only
be four types of agents denoted by LL, HL, LH and HH, where LL stands
for low eﬃciency in both activities, HL means high eﬃciency in activity A
and low eﬃciency in activity B and so on. The principal does not observe
the realization of technology, but the probability of occurrence of each type,
denoted by αij with i,j = L,H, is common knowledge.
The agent’s utility is separable in the two activity levels and quasi-linear
in income. Denoting by T a payment from the agent to the principal, the








We assume that the function uk
i (·) is diﬀerentiable, monotone and strictly
concave with uk







we denote the incremental utility in activity k. We assume that δk(x) ≥ 0
and that δk(·) is increasing, i.e. δk0
(x) > 0. Therefore, the ‘single-crossing’
property is satisﬁed in each activity, i.e. the marginal utility in activity k is
monotone in type realizations.
The principal welfare, which is assumed to be additively separable in
activity levels and quasi-linear in income, may also depend on agent’s utility















i (·) is an increasing and concave function. The parameter 0 ≤ β ≤
1 is the weight the principal places on the agent’s welfare. For example,
3in a regulatory context such as Baron and Myerson (1982) a low level of
β represents a strong distributive concern of the regulation authority (the
principal) in favor of consumer welfare rather than monopoly proﬁts.
The principal oﬀers the agent a menu of contracts specifying, for each
type ij, the activity levels, xA
ij and xB
ij, in return for a payment, Tij. The
contracts (xA
ij,x B











for all pairs ij and i0j0. Moreover, individual rationality (IR) requires that
each type obtains a level of utility not less than an outside option level which
is normalized to zero; therefore the implementable contracts must also satisfy




ij) − Tij ≥ 0, for all i,j.
























i (x) is total surplus from activity k. Also, the IC
constraints can be rewritten as









for all pairs ij and i0j0 and the IR constraints as Rij ≥ 0. For convenience we
shall consider the menu of contracts (xA
ij,x B




i we denote the ﬁrst-best level of activity k, i.e. the level of xk
which maximizes total surplus wk
i (xk). We assume that ﬁrst-best levels are
increasing in the type realizations, i.e. ¯ xk
H > ¯ xk
L, for k = A,B.
4For future reference let us introduce the following function
x




where ζ is a real variable. We assume that wk
L
0
(x) goes to inﬁnity as x goes to
0, so that xk(ζ) is never negative. It is easily seen that xk(ζ) is a decreasing
function with xk(0) = ¯ xk
L. To further simplify notation let
ˆ δk(ζ): =δk(xk(ζ)) (2)
so that ˆ δk(ζ) is a decreasing function.
Finally, notice that, xk(ζ) can be interpreted as the activity level of the
low type in a single-dimensional problem where only activity k is taken into
account. For example, substituting k = A and ζ =( 1− β)[αHL/αLL] in (1)
gives the optimal contract level of activity A for the low eﬃciency type in
a single-dimension, single-activity screening problem where only types HL







will be the informational rent of the high eﬃciency type, RHL.
3. The model without the high eﬃciency type
Let us consider the ﬁrst model with only three types and speciﬁcally the
case where the most eﬃcient agent in both the activities is missing, i.e. the
case where αHH = 0. Therefore, we have two ‘mixed’ types, HL and LH,
and the non specialized type of agent, LL.























LH) − (1 − β)RLH]
5The screening problem consists in ﬁnding a menu of contracts (xA
ij,x B
ij,R ij)
maximizing L subject to the individual rationality (IR) and incentive com-
patibility (IC) constraints. It is not diﬃcult to see that the optimal contract




LL and that the IC constraints of
type LL always hold with a strict inequality; therefore the only potentially
IC binding constraints are those of types HL and LH, i.e.


















From the analysis of the ﬁrst order conditions we see that there are three
diﬀerent forms of the optimal contract. Each of these cases corresponds to a
speciﬁc pattern of binding IC constraints and is determined by the particular
speciﬁcation of utility functions and the distribution of types.
Let us deﬁne












The magnitude M, which can be computed directly from the data of the
problem, turns out to be crucial in determining the actual pattern of binding
incentive constraints and therefore the shape of the optimal contract. The
economic interpretation of M is not diﬃcult to grasp; for example, let’s take
activity A. As we know from Section 2, when the ‘oﬀ-diagonal’ IC constraints
are neglected, ˆ δA((1 − β)αHL/αLL) is the minimal informational rent that
prevents the agent specialized in activity A from mimicking the low eﬃciency
type LL. A similar interpretation holds for ˆ δB((1 − β)αLH/αLL), therefore,
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Fig. 1. Patterns of binding constraints
M gives the relative proﬁtability in terms of potential rents between the
mixed type specialized in A, HL, and the mixed type specialized in B, LH.
Case A.
The ‘oﬀ-diagonal’ IC constraint of type HL with respect to LH, (3), is
binding. This case occurs whenever the following condition holds
δA(¯ xA
L) − δB(¯ xB
H) >M (7)
The left hand side is the ‘net’ incremental utility of type HL with respect to
type LH in both lines of activities when the former mimicks the latter and
the activity levels are ﬁxed at LH ﬁrst-best. If this term is greater than M
then the type HL has a stronger incentive in mimicking the type LH rather
than the type LL.
Case B.
The ‘oﬀ-diagonal’ IC constraint of type LH with respect to HL, (5), is
binding. This case is the mirror image to case A and occurs whenever the
7following condition holds
δA(¯ xA
H) − δB(¯ xB
L) <M (8)
Case C.
Only ‘downward’ IC constraints are binding, i.e. (4) and (6). This case














The three patterns of incentive constraints are depicted in ﬁgures 1 and
2, wherea solid line pointing from type ij to type i0j0 means that the incentive
constraint that ij not be tempted to chose the i0j0 contract is binding.
The main features of the optimal contract in each of the three cases are
summarized in the following
Proposition 1.
Let αHH =0 . In all the three cases, A, B and C, the low eﬃciency type,
LL, does not earn any rent, i.e. RLL =0 , and has below ﬁrst-best levels in
both activities, i.e. xk
LL < ¯ xk
L, for k = A,B. Moreover, in all the three cases
the mixed types, HL and LH, earn strictly positive rents, i.e. RHL > 0 and
RLH > 0.
In Case A, the mixed type specialized in activity A, HL, has eﬃcient




L the levels of the
agent specialized in activity B, LH, are distorted away from ﬁrst-best levels.
Speciﬁcally, the activity levels of type LH are above ﬁrst-best in the specialized
activity and below ﬁrst-best in the non specialized activity, i.e. xA
LH < ¯ xA
L
and xB
LH > ¯ xB
H.
Case B is the mirror image of Case A.
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Fig. 2. Pattern of binding constraints – Case C.
In Case C, both the mixed types, HL and LH, have ﬁrst-best levels in









The proof is in Appendix A.
In order to give a rough idea of the circumstances under which the
various cases apply let us consider the special situation of perfect simmetry
of activities and types, that is we assume that incremental utility is the
same in each activity, i.e. δA(x)=δB(x), and mixed types have the same
probability, i.e. αHL = αLH. It can be easily veriﬁed that under perfect
simmetry (7) and (8) are violated so that only case C can occur. Therefore,
cases A and B are possible only when relevant asimmetries are present in
activities as well as types.
There are two remarks about Proposition 1. First, Case C exhibits a
non standard feature as compared to the analysis of one-dimensional models.
Indeed, the optimal contract implements ﬁrst-best levels of two types rather
than only one. Speciﬁcally, the ‘no distortion at the top’ rule applies here to
both the mixed types.
The second remark is concerned with the kind of distorsions required by
9the optimal contract. In cases A and B one of the mixed types has a peculiar
pattern of activity levels, i.e. the agent over-produces with respect to the
ﬁrst-best levels in the most eﬃcient activity and under-produces in the less
eﬃcient activity. As already noticed in the literature on multi-dimensional
screening, this feature of the optimal contract is at odds with respect to the
models with one-dimensional private information.
4. The model without the low eﬃciency type
Let us consider a model with only three types where the agent with
low eﬃciency in both activities is missing, i.e. the case where αLL =0 .
Therefore, we have two ‘mixed’ types, HL and LH, and the most eﬃcient
type of agent, HH.























LH) − (1 − β)RLH]
Clearly, the IR constraints of type HH is always met so that the potentially
IR and IC binding constraints are the following
RHH ≥ RHL + δB(xB
HL) (10)




RHL ≥ 0 (12)
RHL ≥ RHH − δB(xB
HH) (13)







RLH ≥ 0 (15)
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Fig. 3. Binding constraints – Case A.











For the analysis of the optimal contract we can identify three main cases.
Each of these cases corresponds to a speciﬁc pattern of binding constraints
as depicted in ﬁgures 3 and 4.
Case A.
Both the IC constraints, (10) and (11), of the high eﬃciency type, HH,
are binding simultaneously, as depicted in ﬁgure 3. This case occurs when
both the following conditions are satisﬁed,
δA(¯ xA
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Fig. 4. Patterns of binding constraints – Case B
Under this condition the IC constraint of type HH with respect to type HL,
(10), must necessarily be binding and we have the two possible patterns of
binding IC constraints as depicted in ﬁgure 4.
Case B.(i). Only one IC constraint is binding and this occurs when the
following condition holds:
δA(¯ xA






(notice that this means that (18) is violated since ¯ xA
H > ¯ xA
L).
Case B.(ii). This case occurs when (20) is violated and we have three
IC binding constraints, (10), (16) and (17), as depicted in Figure 4.
Case C.
This case is characterized by the violation of (19). Since it is the mirror
image of case B, it will not be treated explicitly.
Proposition 2.
Let αLL =0 . In case A the high eﬃciency type has a positive infor-





H. The low eﬃciency activities of the mixed types,
HL and LH, are distorted downwards, i.e. xA
LH < ¯ xA
L and xB
HL < ¯ xB
L, and
both types earn zero rent, thus RHL = RLH =0 .
In case B.(i), the LH and HH types have ﬁrst-best levels in both activities;
the level of activity B of the HL type is distorted downward, i.e. xB
HL < ¯ xB
L.
Only type HH has a positive rent while RHL = RLH =0 .





H, while type HH has an upward distortion in activity A, i.e.
xA
HH > ¯ xA
H. The mixed type HL has an upward distortion in activity A and
a downward distortion in activity B, i.e. xA
HL > ¯ xA
H and xB
HL < ¯ xB
L. Both,
LH and HH have positive rents while RHL =0 .
The proof is in Appendix B.
As we did is Section 3 we can consider the situation of perfect simmetry
in order to see when the various cases apply. It is not diﬃcult to check that
under perfect simmetry (18) and (19) are always met, so that only case A
can occur. Then we can conclude that cases B and C can only occur when
the model displays strong asimmetries in types as well as activities.
The model studied in the present section exhibits several interesting
features expecially in case B. In B.(i) it is quite unusual that the mixed type
HL has ﬁrst-best levels in both activities as well as the most eﬃcient type,
HH. Here, as in Section 3, the optimal contract implements pareto-optimal
activity levels for two types out of three. Moreover, while HH has a positive
rent, the type LH is eﬃcient but does not earn any rent. Thus, in case B.(i)
both the mixed types have zero rent.
However, the most striking situation is the one contemplated by case
B.(ii). Indeed, it is one of the ‘mixed’ types, LH, who plays the role of the
‘best’ type and not the high eﬃciency agent, as is usual. LH has ﬁrst-best
13activity levels while HH exhibits ‘upward’ distortions in activity A, in the
sense that the optimal contract prescribes an activity level above ﬁrst-best.
Here we have a violation of the one-dimensional model rule which says ‘no
distortion at the top’.
Finally, another peculiar feature is the pattern of distortions imposed
on the other mixed type by the optimal contract. Type HL displays upward
distortion in the high eﬃciency activity and downward distortion in the low
eﬃciency activity. The presence of both upward and downward distortions
is an all mark of multi-dimensional screening problems as we have seen also
in Section 3.
5. The model with only one ‘mixed’ type
In order to complete the analysis we study a model where one of the
mixed types, let us say type LH, is missing, i.e. αLH = 0. Therefore, our
model consists of the three types LL, HL and HH. The analysis of this
case is very similar to the one-dimensional case, indeed, the three types can
be completely ordered in terms of overal incremental utility. Following the
method of Spence (1980) (see also Brighi D’Amato (1998)) for the analysis
of the binding IR and IC constraints, it can be sen that the optimal contract
satisﬁes the conditions RLL = 0 and RHL = δA(xA
LL) and the pattern of
binding constraints is as depicted in ﬁgure 5. The principal’s optimization
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Fig. 5. Pattern of binding constraints












Let αLH =0 . The optimal contract has the following features: The high





H. The ‘mixed’ type HL has a




HL < ¯ xB
L. The low eﬃciency type has zero rent
and both the activity levels are distorted downward, i.e. xA




HL < ¯ xB
L.
The proof is in Appendix C.
As it was expected, the optimal contract conforms to the standard one-
dimensional case so that it obeys the well known rule of ‘no distortion at the
top, no rent at the bottom’.
156. Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have seen that even in a relatively simple screening model
the multidimensionalityof agent’s private information generates several kinds
of optimal contracts. We identify the conditions which discriminate between
the various cases and determine the characteristics of the optimal contracts.
These conditions have a fairly intuitive economic interpretation and can be
easily computed from the primitive data of the model.
The main conclusion of our analysis of models with three types is that
when either the most eﬃcient or the least eﬃcient type are missing, the
optimal screening contracts may exhibit very unusual and peculiar charac-
teristics. For example, it may well happen that not only the most eﬃcient
but also other types of agents have ﬁrst-best activity levels. Also, we have
a case where even the activity levels of the most eﬃcient type, HH, are
distorted and this is a striking violation of the single-dimensional optimal
contracting rule saying ‘no distortion at the top’. As we have seen, these
‘anomalies’ in optimal contracts are more likely to occur the stronger are the
asimmetries in the technology of activities and in the probability of types.
Finally, we notice that typically in continuous type two-dimensional
screening models the optimal contracts specify a ‘non-participation’ region
where the least eﬃcient types are excluded from any activity.4 Accordingly,
the model of Section 4, with only the high eﬃciency type and the two ‘mixed’
types, is perhaps the one which best approximate the properties of optimal
contracts in multidimensional settings and which provides more reliable pre-
scriptions in applications.
4 This is the main result in Armstrong (1996).
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γ2 + γ4 =( 1− β)(αHL + αLH)( A.2)
γ3 + γ4 = γ1 +( 1− β)αLH (A.3)
where γ1 ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (3), γ2 of (4), γ3 of (5)
and γ4 of (5). From (A.2) we know that at least one of the two constraints
(4) and (6) must be binding. Moreover, we see that the constraints (3) and
(5) can not be simultaneously binding. Indeed, let γ1, γ3 > 0, so that (3)



















HL therefore (A.4) can not hold. Thus, γ1, γ3 > 0 can not occur.
Now we show that both the constraints (4) and (6) must be simultane-
ously binding , i.e. γ2, γ4 > 0.
If γ1 = γ3 = 0 it follows trivially from (A.2) and (A.3) that γ2, γ4 > 0.
Let us suppose that γ3 > 0 (and hence γ1 = 0) and γ4 = 0, so that γ2 > 0.
17Therefore, (4) and (5) hold as equalities and (6) hold as a strict inequality.



















LL and therefore eq. (A.5) can not hold. Thus, if
γ3 > 0 then γ4 > 0, but then, from (A.2) and (A.3), it is easy to see that
also γ2 > 0.
In a similar way it can be shown that if γ1 > 0 then γ2, γ4 > 0. Thus,
we can summarize the above analysis as follows:
(i) The ‘downward’ incentive constraints are always binding, i.e. γ2 > 0
and γ4 > 0.
(ii) No more than one of the two oﬀ-diagonal incentive constraints can
be binding.
Therefore, we only have three possible patterns of binding constraints
Case A. γ1, γ2, γ4 > 0 and γ3 =0 .
Case B. γ3, γ2, γ4 > 0 and γ1 =0 .
Case C. γ2, γ4 > 0 and γ1 = γ3 =0 .
Let us solve the pricipal problem in Case A. By substituting the equal-














Now we ﬁnd necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the above equation to
hold. From (A.2) and (A.3) we write γ4 and γ1 in terms of γ2,
γ4 =( 1− β)(αHL + αLH) − γ2
γ1 =( 1− β)αHL − γ2
18Now, let us substitute γ1 and γ4 into (A.1) so that the optimal activity levels
only depend on γ2. Let us deﬁne the following functions
A(t)=ˆ δA
￿
















(1 − β)(αHL + αLH) − t
αLL
￿
for 0 ≤ t ≤ (1 −β)αHL. We easily see that, A(t) is increasing and A(0) < 0.
On the other hand, B(t) is decreasing, B(0) > 0 and it is always positive.
Therefore, equation (A.6) holds for some 0 <t<(1 − β)αHL if and only if
























The proof of Case B is analogous. Finally, the proof of Case C is a trivial
consequence. The optimal contracts are computed in each case by solving
for the value of the multipliers and using the equations of the IC constraints.
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γ1 + γ2 = λ1 + µ1 +( 1− β)αHH (B.2)
λ0 + λ1 + λ2 = γ1 + µ2 +( 1− β)αHL (B.3)
µ0 + µ1 + µ2 = γ2 + λ2 +( 1− β)αLH (B.4)
where γ1 and γ2 are the Lagrange multipliers of constraints (10) and (11),
λ0, λ1 λ2 are the multipliers of (12), (13) and (14) and µ0 µ1, µ2 are the
multipliers of (15), (16) and (17). The complementary slackness conditions
are omitted for simplicity.
From (B.2) at least one of the γ multipliers must be positive. Let us
consider ﬁrst the case where γ1, γ2 > 0. Thus, both the IC constraints of
type HH are binding and we have
RHH = RLH + δA(xA
LH)=RHL + δB(xB
HL)( B.5)
In can be easily checked that the constraints (13), (14), (16) and (17) are
satisﬁed with strict inequality. For instance, let us take the constraint (13).
From (B.1) we have xB
HH >x B
HL so that δB(xB
HH) >δ B(xB
HL) and RHL >
(RHL + δB(xB
HL)) − δB(xB
HH) so that by equality (10) we have that (13) is
20satisﬁed with strict inequality. In a similar way it can be seen that also (14),
(16) and (17) are strictly satisﬁed so that we must have λ1 = λ2 = µ1 =
µ2 = 0. From (B.3) and (B.4) λ0 > 0, µ0 > 0 so that RHL = RLH = 0 and








In order to ﬁnd necessary and suﬃcient conditions for (B.6) to hold let us
express γ1 in terms of γ2, by using (B.2), i.e.
γ1 =( 1− β)αHH − γ2









(1 − β)αHH − γ2
αHL
￿
The function A(γ2) is decreasing and A(0) = δA(¯ xA
L) and A((1 − β)αHH)=
δA((1−β)αHH/αLH). The function B(γ2) is increasing and B(0) = δB((1−
β)αHH/αHL) and B((1 − β)αHH)=δB(¯ xB
L).
Therefore, we see that there exists 0 <γ ∗
2 < (1−β)αHH such that (B.6)
holds if and only if














and these are respectively conditions (18) and (19) in the text.
Let us turn to case B and suppose that γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0 so that
RHH = RHL + δB(xB
HL) >R LH + δA(xA
LH)( B.7)




HL, therefore, it is not
diﬃcult to see that at the optimal contract the IC constraints of type HL,
21i.e. (13) and (14), are satisﬁed with a strict inequality. Hence λ1 = λ2 =0
so that, by (B.3), λ0 > 0. Thus we have RHL = 0 and, from (10), RHH =
δB(xB
HL).
Let us consider the remaining constraints of type LH and the µ mul-
tipliers. Consider ﬁrst the case where µ0 > 0, so that RLH = 0. It can be
shown that either (i) both µ1 and µ2 are equal to zero or (ii) both are strictly
positive. Indeed, let µ1 = 0, i.e. (16) holds as a strict inequality so that we
have δA(xA
HL) >δ B(xB
HL). From B.1w eh a v exA
HH ≥ xA
HL so that also (17)
holds a s a strict inequality and µ2 = 0. Using a similar argument it can be
shown that also µ2 = 0 implies µ1 = 0. This proves (i). Point (ii) is proved
similarly.
Case B.(i) in Section 4 corresponds to the following pattern of mul-











HL) < 0( ∗)





B(γ1 =( 1− β)αHH/αHL)
so that (*) corresponds to condition ??(20).
Let us turn to case B.(ii) which is characterized by the following pattern
of multipliers: µ0 =0 ,µ1 > 0 and µ2 > 0. Since µ0 = 0 we have RLH >
0. From (B.4) at least one of the µ’s must be strictly positive. Let us
suppose that µ2 > 0, hence (16) holds as an equality and RLH = δB(xB
HL)−
δA(xA
HL) > 0. Moreover, using (17) we obtain δA(xA
HH) ≥ δA(xA
HL), that by
(B.1) requires µ1 > 0. Similarly it can be shown that µ1 > 0 implies µ2 > 0.
Finally, the pattern of multipliers implies δA(xA
HH)=δA(xA


































































γ1 + γ2 =( 1− β)αHH (C.2)
where γ1 and γ2 are the Lagrange multiplier of IC constraints of type HH.
From C.1 and C.2 it is easily seen that both the multipliers must be strictly
positive so that, by (21) and (22), we have xB
HL = xB
LL and we obtain
γ1 =( 1− β)
αHLαHH
αLL + αHL
γ2 =( 1− β)
αLLαHH
αLL + αHL
From the values of the multipliers it is easy to compute all the feature of the
optimal contract.
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